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Abstract 
　　 Due to heavy deficits, the privatization of Japanese National Railways (JNR) was initiated on April 1, 1987 and was 
geographically divided into six different railway companies for transporting passengers. This paper investigates the impact of 
market competition on conventional rail (CR) passengers’ time cost by using a difference-in-differences (DID) approach and 
directional origin-destination (OD) pair level data in four periods: two years before JNR’s privatization (1976 and 1986) and two 
years after JNR’s privatization (1996 and 2006). It investigates the effect of market competition on passengers’ time cost in the 
regions where CR competes with high-speed rail (HSR), when comparing with monopoly region after JNR privatization. The result 
of this analysis shows that market competition leads to an increment in passengers’ time cost by CR in duopoly regions when 
comparing with the change of time cost by CR in monopoly region, but it is not statistically significant.
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1. Introduction
　　 Among a number of theoretical & empirical studies in the field of economics, the topic of market competition has attracted 
the attention of many researchers (Chamberlin, 1933; Lerner, 1934; Fujita, 1988; Parenti et al., 2017). Therefore, a number of 
studies try to investigate whether this kind of relationship or even casual inference exists between market competition and service/
product quality. Many studies find that competition improves service/product quality (Mazzeo, 2003; Greenfield, 2014; Pan et al., 
2015; Bergman et al., 2016). Some papers show the negative effect of competition on service quality. Propper et al. (2004) found 
the relationship between competition and quality of care to be negative, while the estimated effect was quite small. Forder and 
Allan (2014) found that higher competition pushed down quality as the price and revenue decreased, while the lower quality was 
due to decrease in price instead of competition. Lahiri and Ono (1988) found that by eliminating or impairing minor firms, a 
government can actually increase welfare.
　　 This study investigates the impact of market competition between CR and HSR transport service on passengers’ time cost by 
using CR. By using a difference-in-differences (DID) approach, it compares passengers’ time cost on certain origin-destination 
(OD) pair before and after 1987. The data was collected from timetables published in four different years under by same company-
Japan Travel Bureau (JTB) Foundation. The two years before 1987 are year 1976 and 1986, and the other two years after 1987 are 
year 1996 and 2006. In this research, only local & rapid trains that just need base fare are included. Table 1 shows the different 
types of CR services on the Tokyo-Osaka route that are provided by JR companies. 
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　　 Due to heavy deficits, JNR, a state-owned public corporation, was divided into six railway companies for transporting 
passengers after April 1, 1987. The six Japanese Railway (JR) companies for transporting passengers are Hokkaido Railway 
company (JR Hokkaido), East Japan Railway Company (JR East), Central Japan Railway Company (JR Central), West Japan 
Railway Company (JR West), Shikoku Railway Company (JR Shikoku) and Kyushu Railway Company (JR Kyushu). Each of 
them is in charge of CR and parallelly-running HSR services in certain region (if HSR service is available in that region). 
　　 For the busy Tokyo-Osaka route, CR service provided by three diff erent companies. CR service between Tokyo and Atami is 
provided by JR East; between Atami and Maibara, it is provided by JR Central; and between Maibara and Osaka, it is provided by 
JR West. However, HSR service on the Tokyo-Osaka route is provided only by JR Central. Therefore, CR and HSR on the Tokyo-
Atami route and the Maibara-Osaka route compete with each other, since they belong to diff erent companies. As both CR and HSR 
services are provided by JR Central on the Atami-Maibara route, rail transport service is in monopoly. Figure 1 shows the operating 
condition of HSR and CR on the Tokyo-Osaka route. All these conform to the research design of this study, for measuring the 
diff erence in the impact of duopoly and monopoly, before and after JNR’s privatization.
Table 1. Diff erent Types of Conventional Rail (CR) Services
Train Type Base Fare  Express fee Stops
Local Need No need Every station
Rapid Need No need Less than local, but more than express
Express Need Express fee Less than rapid, more than limited express
Limited Express Need Limited Express fee Only stop at main stations
Note: For reserved seats, extra reservation fee is necessary. 
Figure 1. Operating Condition of HSR and CR for Tokyo-Osaka Route
　　 CR service on the Tokyo-Osaka route existed for many years, before HSR service first parallelly operated in 1964. CR 
provides low-cost transport services that compete with HSR in some regions. Even though no CR provides direct transport service 
for the Tokyo-Osaka route, the trip can be easily completed through transfers. When comparing with HSR, CR has some 
disadvantages, such as more time cost and unavoidable transfers. As CR’s speed is just half of HSR’s and it needs transfer time, 
time cost of travelling through CR is more than twice of HSR (shown in Table 2). Fortunately, the selection of transfer stations is 
fl exible, and transfer is convenient, without the need to get out of the stations. Therefore, CR has its advantages with disadvantages, 
when compared to HSR.
Type Distance Time cost (shortest) Least Transfer Ticket Price (JPY) Frequency
CR 552.6km More than 9h 3 6,600 Less than HSR
HSR 552.6km 3h10min 0 11,000 80
Note:  Here CR just considers the non-reserved seat service which only cost base fare. Ticket price for HSR here is price of non-reserved seat 
which is the base fare.  
Data source: JR Timetable, published by Japan Travel Bureau Foundation, 1982.
Table 2. CR V.S HSR (Tokyo Station ←→ Shin-Osaka Station, 1982)
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　　 The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a literature review of related studies on the effect of market 
competition in different industries. Identification strategy and a description of the data are separately showed in section 3 and 4. 
Section 5 presents the analysis results and its interpretations, as well the discussion. Section 6 provides the conclusion. 
2. Literature review
　　 As competition is important in a market system, many economists are interested in analyzing the effect of market 
competition. Previous studies have discussed about the impact of market competition, especially theoretical works (Spence, 1975; 
Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979; Perry and Porter, 1985; Suzumura and Kiyono, 1987; Maskin and Tirole, 1988; Hsu et al., 2010; Xia 
and Zhang, 2016; Tsunoda, 2018) and empirical studies, which investigated the relationship between market competition and 
service/product quality (Propper, 2004; Greenfield, 2014; Pan, 2015). However, only a few empirical studies discuss the causal 
inference of market competition on service quality. 
　　 Among the limited empirical studies that estimate the causal inference of market competition, most of them investigate the 
effect of competition on health care services (Forder and Allan, 2014; Bergman et al., 2016) and the impact of competition between 
HSR and airlines (Albalate, 2015; Wan et al., 2016; Zhang et al., 2017). Empirical literatures exist for other industries, such as 
education industry (Hoxby, 2000), supermarket industry (Bonanno and Lopez, 2009) and newspaper industry (Tang and Wang, 
2005), while their number is less. Besides, many of them are not perfect in research design, as they analyze the problem without 
observation fixed effect, existing reverse causality or confounders. As panel data in this study is analyzed with year and OD fixed 
effects and taken consideration for heterogeneity, it can be a better way for examining the impact of competition in transportation 
field, where randomized experiment is almost impossible. 
　　 Almost all the studies that discuss about competition between HSR and CR use theoretical approach for analysis. Hsu et al. 
(2010) analyzed competition and cooperation between HSR and CR by studying two roughly-parallel rail systems in Taiwan, 
although they just used game theoretical approach and the data used to test their models was only one year. Raturi and Verma 
(2013) used game theoretical approach to analyze the impact of HSR introduction and used passengers’ time cost and monetary 
cost data to analyze the sensitivity of equilibrium state, although only simulation data was used. Different from these theoretical 
studies, this study randomly generates different target arrival time (TAT), collects time cost data for them from published JR 
timetables, and then takes average as time cost for each origin-destination (OD) pair. This study proceeds by using panel data and 
difference-in-differences approach to analyze causal inference in railway industry. As rail transportation accounts for a high 
percentage in transportation industry and is closely related to quality of daily lives, it is necessary to carry out this research.
3. Identification strategy 
　　 As described in the introduction part, rail transport services for the Tokyo-Atami and the Maibara-Osaka routes changed from 
monopoly to duopoly after 1987, and all the OD pairs on these two routes are included in the treatment group; rail services for the 
Atami-Maibara route is in monopoly for all the years, and all the OD pairs on this route are included in the control group. To 
estimate the effect of changes in market competition between the treatment and control groups, this study uses the difference-in-
differences (DID) approach as the identification strategy. 
　　 This study estimates the impact of market competition along with year and OD pair fixed effects by using four years data 
(1976, 1986, 1996, 2006). By using year and OD pair fixed effects, it can eliminate omitted variable bias. DID approach measures 
the average treatment effect as a difference between the changes in the outcome variable of treatment and control groups over the 
same period. 
　　 Basic DID model in this study is as follows: 
 (1)　　　　　　　　　　　　　
　　 Where Yit as outcome variable and it is time cost for directional OD pair i in year t in this study, Treati is a treated-group 
dummy that takes a value of one if OD pair is located on the Tokyo-Atami route or the Maibara-Osaka route and zero otherwise, 
Postt is a after treatment year (1987) dummy, and it equals to 1 if the year is 1996 or 2006, and 0 otherwise. ϕi and φt are OD and 
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year fixed effects, respectively. α is the estimator of treatment effect in this study. Variable Xit is a set of control variables which 
depend on model specification. Finally, uit is the error term.
4. Data
4. 1 Data sources 
　　 Time cost data used in this research for all four years (1976, 1986, 1996 and 2006) are collected from JR timetables published 
by Japan Travel Bureau (JTB) Foundation. Other variables include: (1) Population data collected from national survey (Kokusei 
Chosa, five years one time). For year 1976, this study uses year 1975 survey data; for year 1986, this study uses year 1985 survey 
data; for the year 1996, this study uses year 1995 survey data; and for 2006, this study uses year 2005 survey data; (2) Per capita 
income data from central government website (Cabinet Office, Government of Japan); (3) GDP deflator from World Bank national 
accounts data and OECD National Accounts data files; (4) Number of stops means the number of conventional rail stations between 
the origin and destination station for each OD pair and is collected from JR timetables published by Japan Travel Bureau (JTB) 
Foundation; (5) The number of private railway companies that compete with JR company for same OD pair (from JR companies).
4.2 Details about the data 
　　 In this research, unit of analysis is directional origin-destination station pair (OD pair) within each region (three regions in 
total). Therefore, two kinds of OD pairs exist here: one kind is where both origin and destination stations are on the Tokyo-Atami 
or the Maibara-Osaka route which is the treatment group; the other kind is where both origin and destination stations are on the 
Atami-Maibara route which is set as control group. 
　　 Stations that included in this study are stations which provide both HSR and CR services for all four years (details are shown 
in following Table 3). Therefore, stations without HSR service or established after 1976 are not included in this analysis. As shown 
in Table 3, the maximum distance for OD pairs in the control group (341.3 km) is nearly three times that of the maximum distance 
for OD pairs in the treatment group (110.5 km). To keep the balance, this study picks up OD pairs in the control group which near 
the borders (Atami and Nagoya) and within the maximum distance of OD pairs in the treatment group (110.5km). As shown in 
Table 3, 12 OD pairs in the control group with 18 OD pairs in the treatment group for each year, making a total of 120 OD pairs for 
all four years.
Group Number of OD Pairs
Maximum 
Distance
Number of OD Pairs Near 
Borders and Within 110.5km
1. Treatment Group
Tokyo-Atami 12 104.6 12
Maibara-Osaka 6 110.5 6
Total 18 110.5 18
2. Control Group
Atami-Maibara 56 341.3 12
All 74 341.3 30
Note:  Stations between Tokyo and Osaka included in this research are: Tokyo, Yokohama (Shin-Yokohama for HSR), Odawara and Atami, 
Mishima, Shizuoka, Hamamatsu, Toyohashi, Gifu (Gifu-hashima for HSR), Maibara, Kyoto and Osaka (Shin-Osaka for HSR). As 
Atami and Maibara station are boundary stations, they are considered in charged by JR companies on both sides.
Table 3. OD Pairs in the Analysis for One Year
　　 In this study, time cost consists of in-vehicle time and schedule delay. In-vehicle time is the time difference between train’s 
actual arrival time and actual departure time (both available in published timetables); schedule delay is the time gap between target 
arrival time and actual arrival time. Target arrival time are 50 randomly generated time points between 6:00 and 24:00 pm in this 
study and actual arrival time is available in published timetables. For each target arrival time, the train that minimizes time cost is 
selected and recorded for all OD pairs. Average of the time cost for all target arrival time is generated as final time cost for each 
OD pair in each year. As delay in arrival is supposed to be not allowed in this study, schedule delay in this research is schedule 
delay early (not schedule delay late). Besides, CR services included in this study are non-reserved seats and without express fee. 
Seasonal trains that run for short periods or trains that run on weekends are not included as well.
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5. Results and interpretations
5.1 Summary statistics
　　 In Table 4, it shows that the average time cost for all OD pairs used in this study is 74.68 minutes. Besides, information for 
time-variant and time-invariant control variables are shown in Table 4 as well.
Variables Observations Mean Standard Deviations Min Max
Time cost (minutes) 120 74.68 32.56 24.03  140.67
Time-variant Controls
Log of Population
(City/Ward Level)
120 12.92 1.89 10.58 15.97
Log of Income per Capita (Prefecture Level) 120 7.76 0.54 6.74 8.46
Number of Stops 120 11 6.37 1 26
Time-invariant Controls
Treatment Group Dummy 30 0.60 0.50 0 1
Number of Competing Private 
Railway Companies
30 0.40 0.72 0 2
Note:  Treatment group dummy is 1, if OD pair is located in treatment group (OD pairs on Tokyo-Atami and Maibara-Osaka route), otherwise 
it is 0. Number of competing private railway companies is the number of private railways that do not belong to JR but provide transport 
service for the OD pairs.
Table 4. Summary Statistics of Empirical Variables (OD Pairs Near Border and Within Distance)
5.2 Balance check
　　 To verify the validity of common trend assumption, balancing test of baseline characteristics was executed as showed in the 
following Table 5. Table 5 presents the balance checks of baseline characteristics between OD pairs in monopoly and duopoly 
areas for the years before JNR’s privatization (1976 and 1986). 
Table 5. Balancing Test of Baseline Characteristics
Control Group Treatment Group (2) - (4)
Observations Mean (Standard Deviations) Observations
Mean
(Standard Deviations)
Differences
[Standard Errors]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Comparison by Level (using 1976 and 1986 data)
Time cost/Distance (minutes/km) 24 1.641(0.324) 36
1.327
(0.262)
0.314
[0.076]***
Other characteristics
Population/10,000 24 52.504 (73.89) 36
239.159
(299.273)
-186.655
  [62.479]***
Income per Capita 24 1,658.734(773.155) 36
1,823.859
(853.925)
-165.125
[216.839]
Number of Stops / Distance 12 0.153(0.047) 18
0.171
(0.042)
-0.018
[0.016]
Number of Competing Private Rail Companies 12 0.167(0.389) 18
0.556
(0.856)
-0.389
[0.265]*
Panel B: Comparison by Change (Between 1976 and 1986)
Changes in Time cost/Distance 12 -0.153(0.089) 18
-0.106
(0.104)
-0.048
[0.037]
Other characteristics
Changes in Population/10,000 12 1.164(1.420) 18
0.114
(20.447)
1.050
[5.947]
Changes in Income per Capita 12 1,497.425(101.183) 18
1,586.379
(258.153)
-88.954
[78.602]
Note:  Standard deviations are given in parentheses and standard errors are given in square bracket. Significant differences are indicated as: 
* means p value<0.1, **means p value<0.05, *** means p value <0.01. 
Bing HE and  Yuichiro YOSHIDA56
　　 As shown in panel A in Table 5, mean of time cost per distance in control group is significantly higher than that in treatment 
group (duopoly) at 1% level. This might be due to speed difference that affects in-vehicle time or frequency difference that affects 
schedule delay early. Besides, population in treatment group is significantly higher than population in control group at 1% level. 
This is because Tokyo, Yokohama and Osaka stations (in treatment group) all located in big cities. Population of these cities are 
much higher when compared with population of cities that OD pairs in control group (Atami-Maibara) are located. As for per 
capita income and number of stops per distance, there is no significant difference among the treatment and control group. As shown 
in table 5, the number of competing private companies in treatment group is higher than that in control group at 10% significant 
level. This is reasonable as OD pairs in treatment group are located in Tokyo and Osaka regions and have relatively higher 
passengers’ volume along with more private railway companies that compete with JR companies. Additionally, number of 
competing private rail companies for both groups in this study does not change over the years.
　　 Panel B of Table 5 shows the changes between year 1976 and 1986 in treatment and control group. It is necessary to check 
whether the changes between treatment group and control group is balanced before treatment, which is a common trend assumption 
in this study. The result shows that there is no significant difference in the change of time cost per distance, population and per 
capita income among treatment and control group between year 1976 and 1986. 
5.3 Effect of Market Competition on Conventional Rail
Table 6. Reduced Form Regressions of Time Cost (Duopoly Effect)
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment × Post1987 (Duopoly) 5.573[3.439]
3.790
[2.600]
2.968
 [2.833]
OD and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Time-variant Controls No Yes Yes
Time-invariant Controls × Post Dummies No No Yes
Observations 120 120 120
R-squared 0.804 0.849 0.868
Note:  Clustered robust standard errors for undirectional OD pairs are showed in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Time-variant controls include ln(population in the origin city), ln(population in the destination city), ln(real income 
per capita in the origin prefecture), ln(real income per capita in the destination prefecture) and number of stops 
between each OD pair. Time-invariant controls include the number of competing private railway companies. 
　　 The result of the OD and year fixed effects analysis in row (1) of Table 6 shows that market competition leads to an increment 
in time cost for the treatment group by 5.573 minutes when comparing with the change of time cost in control group, but it is not 
statistically significant. The row (2) shows the regression result after additional including time-variant controls. The reduced form 
regressions result in row (2) show that coefficient of duopoly is 3.790, which means market competition leads to an increment of 
time cost in treatment group by 3.790 minutes on an average when comparing with the change of time cost in control group, but it 
is still not statistically significant. The row (3) shows regression result after additionally including Time-invariant controls × Post 
dummies. The reduced form regressions result shows that the coefficient of duopoly is 2.968, which means market competition 
leads to an increment of time cost in treatment group by 2.968 minutes on an average when comparing with the change of time cost 
in control group, but it is not statistically significant as well. 
　　 Base on the model used in row (3) of Table 6, another specification by using cross term between Treatment dummy and Year 
is used for additional analysis. Therefore, Treatment × Year 1986, Treatment × Year 1996, Treatment × Year 2006 are used instead 
of Treatment × Post1987, and analysis result is showed in Table 7. As shown in Table 7, coefficient of treatment effect in 1996 is 
3.559 and coefficient of treatment effect in 2006 is -3.119, and both are not statistically significant. Therefore, no statistically sig-
nificant treatment effect is found on passengers’ time cost in treatment group.
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5.4 Discussion
　　 Regression results in Table 6 show that market competition after JR privatization in 1987 led to an increment of time cost in 
treatment group when comparing with change of time cost in control group, but it is not statistically significant. After using the 
Treatment × Year specification used in the analysis of Table 7, we still could not find any statistically significant treatment effect in 
treatment group when comparing with control group. Different from this empirical analysis, theoretical analysis of market compe-
tition on passengers’ time cost by CR is shown in the appendix. There exist following three possible reasons for why above empiri-
cal analysis results are different from the theoretical analysis results showed in the appendix.
　　 First of all, after privatization of JNR in 1987, JR Central improved its CR transport service (by either speed or frequency) on 
the entire route they were in charge of, rather than only improving services around Nagoya station. After the privatization in 1987, 
JR Central replaced the trains it inherited from JNR by new type of trains on whole route (not just around Nagoya) and until 2006, 
80% percentage of its local trains was replaced by the new types of trains. The new type of trains has characteristics like larger 
maximum speed, acceleration and deceleration. Since JR Central used new type of trains, its conventional rail transport service 
could get much improvement in its service like speed and then have potential to increase frequency (link showed in references 
part). Besides, JR Central actually reduced the trains frequency for some low demand route and increased the frequency for the 
busy lines it in charged to obtain more profit (link showed in references part). 
　　 Second, CR services in the regions which were going to be in charged by JR East company and JR West companies probably 
already improved before 1987, as they probably could receive the detailed information on JNR’s privatization before it was 
publicly announced. Those regions could have the chance and incentive to do so, since in July 1982, the central government had 
approved the suggestion of JNR’s privatization and had started taking appropriate actions in 1983. And finally, the public 
announcement was made in 1987. After isochronous operation policy was operated, timetable for some regions changed on March 
14th, 1985, such as in Sendai (belong to JR East after 1987), Nagano (belong to JR East after 1987) and Keihanshin regions 
(Kyoto, Osaka and Kobe regions, which belong to JR West after 1987). Along with the change of timetable, the number of local 
trains operated those regions (belong to JR East and JR West after 1987) got huge increasement. 
　　 Third, but not the least, different from HSR service which is only provided by JR Central company for the Tokyo-Osaka route 
after 1987, three different JR companies are in charge of CR transport services between Tokyo and Osaka. As these three JR 
companies are so different in population density and operating net income, their behavior might be different and that probably led 
to the estimated market competition results shown in this study. For conventional rail service, the population density somehow can 
reflect the demand which could be he incentive for the JR companies to improve their services. The population density on Tokyo-
Atami route (JR East) is much higher than Maibara-Osaka (JR West), and the population density on Maibara-Osaka (JR West) is 
much higher than that on Atami-Maibara (JR Tokai). For JR companies, their operating net income somehow can show their ability 
(4)
Treatment × Year 1986 2.413[3.211]
Treatment × Year 1996 3.559[3.217]
Treatment × Year 2006 -3.119[1.879]
OD and year fixed effects Yes
Time-variant controls Yes
Time-invariant controls × Post dummies Yes
Observations 120
R-squared 0.877
Note:  Clustered robust standard errors for undirectional OD pairs are showed in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Time-variant controls include ln(population in the origin city), ln(population in the 
destination city), ln(real income per capita in the origin prefecture), ln(real income per capita in the 
destination prefecture) and number of stops between each OD pair. Time-invariant controls include 
the number of competing private railway companies. Treatment × Year 1986 is the cross term between 
treatment dummy and year 1986. Treatment × Year 1996 is the cross term between treatment dummy 
and year 1996. Treatment × Year 2006 is the cross term between treatment dummy and year 2006.
Table 7. Reduced Form Regressions of Time Cost (Duopoly Effect)
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and their budget to invest on infrastructure and their machines to improve their transport services. Take 2000-2001 fiscal year as an 
example, the operating net income for JR East, JR Tokai and JR West was 69.2 billion JPY, 53.0 billion JPY and 31.0 billion JPY 
respectively, which is much different in amount (link showed in references part).
6. Conclusion
　　 Due to the privatization of Japanese National Railways (JNR) in 1987, it was geographically divided into six different railway 
companies for passenger transport service. This paper investigated the impact of market competition on passengers’ time cost by 
conventional rail through using difference-in-difference approach. Results of the analysis which includes OD and year fixed effects 
(time-variant controls and time-invariant control), show that market competition leads to an increment in passengers’ time cost by 
CR in duopoly regions when comparing with the change of time cost in monopoly region, but it is not statistically significant. After 
including the Treatment × Year analysis, statistically significant treatment effect is still not found in the treatment group (duopoly 
region). As a conclusion, market competition leads to an increment in passengers’ time cost by CR in duopoly regions when comparing 
with the change of time cost by CR in monopoly region, but it is not statistically significant.
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Appendix: Market Structure and Travel Time of Parallel Railway
　　 Let us suppose there are two types of train services in parallel denoted by i = 1, 2. Demand of type i train service is a function 
of its own price as well as that of another are shown below: 
　　 which we specify as 　　　　　　　　　　, for  　　　　　　 and  　　　　  being positive parameters, where Qi is 
the demand and Pi is the price of the type i train. Price consists of two parts: ticket price fi and passengers’ time cost ti, then 
 　　　　　for i = 1, 2. Time cost ti of type i train determines the amount of required investment Ki（ti）. Here assume  　　　　　
　　 In duopoly condition, two types of train services are provided by two different companies; while in monopoly condition, two 
types of train services are provided by one company. In duopoly case, each company tries to maximize its profit with respect to 
ticket price fi and time cost ti which can be written as 
　　 First order condition (FOC) is  
　　 Then   
　　 Then 
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　　 For the monopoly condition, one company provides both kinds of train service,
